Tag Archives: Comex

The Path Of Least Resistance For Gold Is Up

The price of gold has held firm at the $1460 (front-month contract basis, not the Kitco “spot” price) level despite the constant price attacks that have been occurring overnight and into the Comex floor trading hours since early November.

On an intra-day basis gold has managed to hold continuous aggressive attempts to push the price below $1460 for the last 6 trading days, including today.  Interestingly, last Tuesday (November 26) and Friday, gold shot up during the Comex floor trading hours in the absence of any news or event triggers.

Zerohedge attributed Tuesday’s spike in gold to the jump offshore yuan vs the dollar. But that day gold started moving before the yuan moved.  On Friday, gold soared as much as $14 from an intra-day low of $1459 while offshore yuan declined vs the dollar.  Zerohedge’s explanation for the mysterious movement in the gold price on two days thus lacks evidence.

The open interest in the December Comex contract remained stubbornly high through first notice day last Friday. The banks, which have an extreme net short position in Comex gold have exerted an enormous effort to force hedge funds either to liquidate long positions or to sell December contracts and move out to February, which is the next “front month” contract.

If an unusually large number of longs decide to stand for delivery, it would place an enormous amount of stress on the warehouse stock of gold that has been designated as available for delivery in Comex vaults. In addition India has been importing an enormous amount of gold starting in late October. This has provided strong price support from the physical market.

Also, the gold price has withstood a 43,000 contract liquidation in Comex open interest, including a 1-day record 127k contract liquidation in the December contract, much of which “rolled” out to February.  Historically a draw down in Comex open interest of this magnitude would have removed at least $50 from the gold price.

In the chart above, gold appears to be establishing a strong base in the $1460 area. The MACD shows an extremely oversold technical condition as does the RSI.  With the Central Banks, including the Fed, printing money at a furious pace right now, the conditions are in place for potentially a big move in gold.

The commentary above is a partial excerpt from my lastest issue of the Mining Stock Journal. In this issue I present an opinion on the Kirkland Lake acquisition of Detour Gold that may surprise some mining stock investors. The junior exploration stocks have been relentlessly pounded lower during this latest sell-off in the sector, especially relative to the shares of the mid-cap and large-cap producing miners. I believe several junior exploration stocks are trading at a price level which significantly reduces the risk and increases the potential ROR in these shares.

The Mining Stock Journal  covers several mining stocks that I believe are extraordinarily undervalued relative to their upside potential. I also present opportunistic recommendations on select mid-tier and large-cap miners that should outperform their peers.  You can learn more about this newsletter here:   Mining Stock Journal information.

Gold May Be Set Up For A Pleasant Holiday Season Rally

In what has become a recent routinized pattern in the price of gold (and silver), the market rallies during peak Indian gold market hours and then sells off when London opens. After the customary price take-down when the Comex floor trading opens, gold and (and silver) typically recoup the overnight sell-off. In short, there seems to be epic price discovery battle going on between paper derivative gold and the physical gold market and that won’t take much to ignite a massive move higher.

The recent sell-off in gold has triggered massive gold demand from India. Recall that India had been dormant since June, when the Government increased the import duty by 25% on imported kilo bars. But the lower price of world gold, combined with India’s peak seasonal gold buying period has unleashed India’s gold importation beast.

Based on premiums being paid for gold after taking into account the import duty, Indian importation is running full-tilt.

Despite repeated attempts to take the price of gold lower, Indian physical demand has put a floor under the market, at least for now, and poses a potential threat to the record level of net short interest in Comex futures by the banks and hedgers…The rest of my commentary came be found at  Gold-Eagle.com.

CME Pledged Gold: Did The Comex Rescue HSBC

A couple days after the CME allowed clearing members to use warehouse warrants as collateral for the mandatory performance bond, the new form of collateral was implemented by HSBC.

With help from Craig Hemke (TF Metals Report) it appears as if the Comex activated a low-grade rescue of HSBC.  Chris Powell at GATA believes this “hypothesis fits the decades-long practice of the international gold price suppression scheme of governments, central banks, and bullion banks. That is, to keep metal moving around so fast that it can be applied to pressure points before its real owners notice that it’s missing — to make a single ounce of gold seem to be in as many as a hundred places at once.”

On November 4 authorization for traders on the New York Commodities Exchange to use “London gold” and Comex gold warrants as collateral was tripled, raised from $250 million to $750 million. HSBC now has used $340 million, or 45.3 percent, of its new collateral limit. It seems more than coincidental that HSBC took advantage of the collateral increase so soon after it was put into effect.

I see the rule change as a low-grade bailout of HSBC, analogous to the Fed’s low grade bailout of the big banks with the “repo” “quantitative easing.” The rule change also flags HSBC as the largest trader in the commitment-of-trader category that designates the percentage of the long and short contracts held by the four largest traders on the Comex.

Assuming, as is likely, that HSBC’s short position was largely put on at lower gold prices, the bank is probably getting hammered with a mark-to-market loss.

Here is the issue that needs to be answered but likely never will be: Do any of the warrants HSBC has pledged as collateral involve gold not owned by HSBC?

In my opinion, probably all the gold in these warrants is not really owned by the bank.

Most likely HSBC is using for collateral purpose gold that does not belong to the bank — customer gold. That is outright hypothecation.

I wonder if the agreement signed by the vault operators allows them to hypothecate gold held in the vault and not owned by the bank.

Now here’s where it gets even more interesting. Assume HSBC is short those warrants pledged as performance bond collateral and the price of gold moves a lot higher. Then HSBC is getting killed technically being short gold collateral it has pledged for its own liability but doesn’t own. How does the bank remedy this?

It uses an exchange-for-phyiscal or privately negotiated transaction using “London gold.” Since HSBC is the vault operator for the major gold exchange-traded fund GLD, this London gold EFP/PNT would likely use GLD vault gold that may or may not have been hypothecated.

HSBC is likely getting financially squeezed to a major extent on its Comex futures short position and the CME bailed it out by changing the collateral and performance bond margin rules.

—–

Did the Comex Just Create More ‘Paper Gold’ For Price Suppression?

A mysterious “pledged gold” entry has just showed up on the Comex gold warehouse report. The definition of this new warehouse stock classification for gold is provided in Chapter 7 of the New York Mercantile Exchange rulebook.

In brief, “eligible” gold is a gold bar stored in a Comex vault that meets Comex specifications (quality, size, purity, and brand).

A “registered” gold bar is one that has been designated for delivery and for which a warrant has been issued. This warrant is evidence of and specifies ownership title to the bar. Warrants facilitate the transfer of delivery under a Comex contract.

“Pledged gold” is a bar for which a warrant has been issued but for which the warrant has been placed on deposit at the CME Clearing House as part of a required performance bond.

The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) has its own clearing division through which all trades are confirmed, matched (counterparties being verified), and settled (money changes hands). Each contract has a long and short counterparty.

A clearing member of the exchange is typically a bank, hedge fund, or commercial entity that has been admitted as a clearing member. The clearing mechanism is the “lubricant” that enables any securities exchange to function.

Part of a clearing member’s responsibility is to assume “full financial and performance responsibility for all transactions executed through them and cleared by the CME.” If you execute a trade on the Comex and fail to pay, the firm that took the other side of your trade is on the hook if you don’t pay for the trade. Or if you have elected to take delivery of a gold bar but can’t pay for it, the Comex member that has the other side of your contract is on the hook for the money.

Each clearing member is required to post a performance bond, a specified minimum amount of funds or collateral value that functions as a reserve to reinforce a clearing member’s obligation to guarantee the trades the clearing member executes. Think of this as a margin requirement.

A warrant that has been issued, which signifies titled interest in a gold bar, can now be used as collateral for the performance bond requirement. A warrant used this way is the “pledged gold” in the warehouse report. The gold bars connected to a warrant being used as collateral cannot be used to satisfy contract delivery requirements of the entity using the warrant as collateral. But the gold connected to warrants is still counted as part of the Comex gold stock.

Additionally, Comex clearing members can use what is called “London gold” as performance bond collateral. The CME rulebook does not define “London gold.” Presumably these are the standard 400-ounce London Bullion Market Association bars stored in a London vault.

But the term “London gold” remains unexplained and nebulous, and recently the CME tripled the amount of “London gold” that can be used by a clearing member as performance bond collateral, increasing it to $750 million from $250 million.

Why has the exchange tripled the amount of “London gold” that can be submitted as performance bond collateral and included Comex gold bar warrants as assets considered acceptable collateral?

As has been well documented, the open interest in Comex gold contracts has just reached a record high. The current open interest, more than 716,000 contracts, is 85 times greater than the “registered” gold stock on the exchange and almost nine times more than the total amount of gold in Comex vaults, including “pledged gold.”

As a technical matter “pledged gold” should not be considered part of warehouse stock because it cannot be delivered. The financial risk assumed by the Comex CME clearing members escalates with each new contract of open interest, especially to the extent that the open interest is “uncovered,” meaning the Comex lacks enough gold to bear the risk of a delivery default.

For this reason the size of the performance bond posted by each clearing member increases pro-ratably with the rising value of the gold contract open interest. (That is, clearing members that process an increased amount of contracts require higher margin deposits.)

This raises the question of the quality of “London gold” as collateral. The issue with “London gold” is whether the gold is verifiably sitting in a London vault or if the posting bank — for example, HSBC — even has legal title to the bar.

Hypothecation is when a bank borrows a gold bar held in its custody for a client, a bar owned by someone else, and uses that bar for another purpose like a delivery requirement or perhaps for posting it as collateral on the CME.

What process is in place to verify that the bank has the right to use that bar, or to verify that the bar even exists?

Even if the entity posting “London gold” as collateral may have some type of documentation showing rights to the bar in London, that bar may have been borrowed — that is, hypothecated by the London vault custodian and sent to Asia or India to satisfy a delivery requirement.

Keep in mind that the Bank for International Settlements now allows “gold receivables” to be counted as gold in custody. This hypothecated bar may exist only as a receivable entry on the books of the London vault operator.

Finally, there is the question of big bank liquidity. The “repo” and money printing recently undertaken by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reflect a liquidity squeeze in the banking system. I would prefer to receive cash as collateral against a performance bond if I were in the business of extending credit for trading activities. Anyone with a brokerage account is required to use cash as margin equity. Try using a piece of paper that says you have titled interest in a gold bar.

It’s quite possible that the ongoing squeeze in big bank liquidity has forced the CME to triple the amount of “London gold” said to be available to the exchange and to include Comex gold warrants as acceptable collateral in lieu of requiring cash or Treasury bonds. This is the only way the CME could present the appearance of financial integrity and security with respect to the soaring gold contract open interest — open interest that is created by bullion banks and hedge funds and that bears almost no relation to the underlying stock of physical gold — to help contain the gold price.

The timing of the expansion of the collateral package is curiously correlated directly with the rapid escalation in gold contract open interest and the recent liquidity squeeze in the banking system.

The tripling of the use of “London gold” and the inclusion of warrants as collateral suggest that the CME and its Comex are preparing to allow an even greater expansion in Comex gold open interest to increase the ability of Comex banks to engage in gold price manipulation. Why else would the CME allow the open interest in gold contracts to dwarf the actual physical gold in Comex vaults?

Ultimately, the use of “London gold” and Comex warehouse warrants expands the fractional-reserve gold banking system and further weaponizes “paper gold” in support of the longstanding bullion bank and central bank campaign to suppress the gold price.

Treasury, CFTC Refuse To Answer Gold Market Rigging Inquiry

For anyone who has studied the issue in-depth, there’s no question that Governments and Central Banks interfere in the gold market (and silver).  The motive is undeniable. Removing price discovery from the gold market enables the Central Banks to sustain the illusion that paper fiat currency is real money.

In addition to all of the evidence gathered and presented to the public over the years (see GATA’s article archive back to 2000), why does the Fed and the Treasury go out of their way to avoid public scrutiny of their gold trading and accounting activities?

The Fed spent millions lobbying Congress and feeding former House Rep Barney Frank’s retirement fund in order to prevent Ron Paul’s audit the Fed legislation from ever getting out of Frank’s House  Committee on Financial Services.  This included hiring Enron’s former chief lobbyist, Linda Robinson.  While Congressman Paul wanted an independent audit of the Fed’s entire operations, he specifically was interested in seeing the files on gold trading, leasing and swaps.  To this day, the Fed refuses any outside inspections of its gold vaults. This includes German Government officials who wanted to see the gold the Fed allegedly “safekeeps” on its behalf.  Why?

U.S. Rep Alex  X.  Mooney has taken over efforts to get to the truth from the U.S. Treasury and the CFTC about its activities in the financial and commodities markets, particularly in the gold and silver markets.   Most of Mooney’s questions on two occasions went unanswered.

GATA has compiled an accounting of Mooney’s fact-finding mission and the refusal of the U.S. Government to respond fully:  “Of course the refusal of the Fed, Treasury, and CFTC to answer the congressman’s questions promptly and fully is strong evidence that the U.S. government is deeply and comprehensively involved in market manipulation.”

You can read entire GATA dispatch with supporting documentation here: Congressman keeps pressing Treasury, CFTC about gold market rigging.

Negative Rates, Money Printing and Gold

“As well as being modified by its specific supply and demand conditions, Gold’s time preference is essentially for its moneyness, represented by its use as a medium of exchange and store of value. The moneyness aspect links it to its exchange value for all commodities, and it is this aspect of gold’s qualities that should warn us that a backwardation in gold, emanating from negative dollar interest rates, will herald a general backwardation in commodities as well.” – Alasdair Macleod, Negative Rates and Gold

The “perfect storm” is forming that will push gold to record highs in U.S. dollars. In 2008 a near-perfect storm hit the global financial system that drove the price of gold to record level in just about every currency including dollars. The only missing ingredient back then was negative interest rates. The same financial excesses that caused the previous financial crisis have reformed only now they are much larger in scale. Most of the western hemisphere has already implemented negative interest rates. Now Trump has opened that Pandora’s Box in the U.S.

Chris Marcus of Arcadia Economics invited me onto this podcast to discuss the implications of Trump’s proposal and how it will affect the precious metals sector:

What’s Driving The Price Of Gold and Silver?

Fear, Greed and Reality. Also Bill Murphy’s “Commercial Signal Failure,” which occurs when physical demand for deliverable gold and silver overwhelms the paper derivative short positions used by the western Central Banks to manage the price of gold and silver.

The naked short position in paper gold and silver is so big that any government or central bank with a substantial FX surplus could pull the plug on it by trading enough Treasuries, or even euros or yen, for real metal. Russia and China, among several other eastern hemisphere Central Banks are doing just that.

Silver Doctor’s James Anderson invited me to discuss the factors behind what appears to be a major move higher in the precious metals, possibly leading to the eventual geopolitical and financial systemic reset (Silver Doctors/SD Bullion):

***************

You can learn more about  Investment Research Dynamics newsletters by following these links (note: a miniumum subscription period beyond the 1st month is not required):  Short Seller’s Journal subscription information   –   Mining Stock Journal subscription information

Don’t Let The CPM Group Feed You A Bag Of Brown Stuff About Silver

The CPM Group and its proprietor, Jeffrey Christian, has operated as one of the “analytic” fronts for the western Central Banks’ paper derivative gold and silver manipulation scheme for many years.  Someone sent me the CPM Group’s latest commentary on silver in which it expresses the view that the price of silver will “fall dramatically” after the September silver contract “roll” on the Comex is over. You can read the brief report here:

CPM Market Commentary 2019-5, Who Is Buying Silver, It’s The Comex Shorts, 2019-08-28

To begin with, the paper price of silver is not being driven higher by short-covering on the Comex. In fact, the big banks/commercials, as well as the “other reportables” and retail traders per the last COT report added over 10,000 contracts to their short position last week. Let’s be clear on one thing, and the years of evidence supporting this is overwhelming, the only time “short covering” drove the price of silver higher was in early 2011 when the big banks were forced to scramble for cover and ran the price of silver close to $50.

The price of silver drops when the big banks short thousands of contracts in an effort to cap a price rally or drive the price lower.

CPM makes the argument that physical demand for silver is not a factor in the recent move higher in the price of silver based on demand for US Silver Eagles per the U.S. Mint report.  This assertion is an insult to the intelligence of anyone who studies the silver market thoroughly. U.S. retail investor silver eagle demand represents less than 5% of the amount of silver produced annually. Industrial demand plus jewelry/ silverware use accounts for roughly 75% of the amount of silver “consumed” annually. It can be argued that U.S. retail demand for coins has very little, if any, influence on the price movement in silver.

Finally, the “roll” of Comex silver open interest from the expiring front month to the next front month – in this case September to December – affects the price of silver maybe to the extent that a significant portion of the expiring front  month open interest does not “roll” out to December and instead sells outright.  First notice day is tomorrow, which means any account holding contracts must either roll or have its account funded to receive delivery of physical silver as early as this evening (the day before official 1st notice).

You’ll note in the report that Christian states that there’s “226.5 million ounces of September open interest to be rolled forward…” This is incorrect – egregiously incorrect in fact. As of Wednesday’s close per the CME’s open interest report, there were 91,109 contracts open in September. Anyone who’s traded Comex paper silver knows each contract represents 5,000 ozs. The o/i at the end of Wednesday was 97,109 contracts, or 485.5 million ozs of paper silver. In all likelihood at least 1/3 to a half of that – or more – will have rolled or sold by the close of Comex pit trading today.

But Christian uses the big numbers to make the situation sound extremely bearish for silver. It’s not. In fact, it will be interesting to see how many contracts will be left standing after today.  Liquidation of September silver contracts by hedge funds (“managed money”) is likely causing the price decline in silver and gold today.  We’ll know for sure tomorrow when the CME o/i report is released. I would not be surprised if more the 50% of the September o/i has liquidated today.

The amount of silver designated as available for delivery (“registered”) as of Wednesday was 91 million ozs.  If just 20% of the open September silver contracts stand for delivery (which is unlikely) the Comex will have a supply problem. However, in all likelihood, most of the open contracts after today’s close will either liquidate – if they are not noticed – or agree to settle in cash (an EFP or PNT). The bottom line is that the September/December “roll” will  have little to no affect on the directional movement of the silver price.

Jeffrey Christian’s CPM Report on silver is little more than  fear propaganda which is woefully short on  facts and long on fairytale-based analysis.  He concludes that “weak investment demand created short positions on the Comex and weak investment demand suggests that prices will not continue to rise.”  Not one letter of one word in that assertion contains even the smallest shred of truth.  Certainly just the flow of capital into the various silver ETFs over the summer contradicts Christian’s absurd claim.

What is driving the price of silver higher? Physical demand from India and China.  Both countries are implementing large-scale solar power build-outs.  Furthermore, India’s population has shifted a considerable amount of demand from gold buying to silver purchases since the Government raised the import duty on gold bars.

Similarly, China’s consumption of silver has likely soared after the Government restricted the supply of gold into the SGE in order to “feed the beast” –  i.e. what is likely massive unreported gold accumulation by the PBoC.  It’s impossible to track China’s real demand for gold and silver since 2014, when the Government opened up Shanghai and Beijing for gold and silver importation.  The amount of metal that flows through those ports is not published by design.

In truth, the inexorable rise this summer in the price of gold and silver is being driven by enormous physical demand not from retail minnows but by large entities primarily in the eastern hemisphere which are accumulating an enormous amount of physical gold and silver. Certainly “footprints” in the snow on the LBMA would support this conclusion.  Do not be bamboozled or scared into selling your physical gold and silver or your mining stocks by charlatans like Jeffrey Christian.

Gold, Silver, Mining Stocks: Get Ready For A Huge Ride Higher

Bullion Star released a graph Tuesday that showed Switzerland exported 90 tonnes of gold to the London gold market (U.K.) in July, which dwarfed exports to India and China.  Bloomberg’s spin on the data was that the gold was needed for ETFs.   Of course, as is typical, the Bloomberg “journalist” likely regurgitated “information” that came from a  source rather than fact-check.

But fact-checking shows that the number of tonnes of gold in GLD, by far the largest gold ETF, increased by only 23 tonnes during July from 800 to 823.  Assume the much smaller gold ETFs took in the same amount collectively – an estimate that is more than generous, and ETF gold flow accounts for less than 50% of the gold  exported to London.

Alternatively, a more likely explanation is that large quantities of physical gold are needed on the LBMA to feed an enormous buyer or buyers in London. This would explain what has become routine “V” shape moves in overnight gold futures trading, as the price of gold shrugs off repetitive attempts to push the price lower after Asia closes and LBMA forward and Comex futures trading replaces the physical gold markets in the eastern hemisphere.

This amount of gold imported by the London gold market also reflects the tight supply that has persisted for quite some time. The presence of a large physical buyer(s) would explain the relentless move higher in the price of gold (and silver).

This chart shows the  US-dollar price of the gold/HUI ratio. When I started to look at this sector back in 2001, gold was re-testing $250, which it hit after the Bank of England dumped half of its gold (400 tonnes) onto the market in 1999 (gold hit $253 on July 20, 1999). The HUI index was around 50 when I began to delve into the sector. This chart sourced from The Felder Report, with my edits, shows how cheap the mining stocks are relative to the price gold:

The ratio of the HUI index to gold has ranged from just over 0.6 in 2003 to the 0.10 it hit in December 2015. I predict that if the price of gold moves over $2000, we could see the HUI/gold ratio converge on 1.0. As the price of gold moves above the average cost for a mining company to pull gold out of the ground, every dollar higher the price moves adds a dollar to the income and cash flow of producing mining companies.

While the mining stocks in general have had a strong move since the end of May, “gold fever” and “mining stock fever” have not infected the general investment audience – yet. As an example, over the last two months of 2008, the HUI doubled (150 to 300). Gold was around $800. From mid-January 2016 to mid-August 2016, the GDXJ tripled. Since the end of May, the GDXJ has moved up 46%. An impressive move to be sure but it has long way to move to match the 2016 move in eight months.

The juniors are even cheaper than the producers. This is because, as the price of gold moves higher, value of the gold (or silver) in the ground for juniors with a resource becomes worth even more to potential acquirers, especially juniors who have projects in close proximity to mining companies with operating mines and infrastructure. At some point, larger mining companies will either have to start buying juniors or face being acquired by even bigger mining companies. Assuming the price of gold/silver continues to move higher from here, I believe we’ll start to see a lot more acquisition activity before the end of the year.

The Remarkable Resiliency Of Gold And Silver

The price of gold continues to hold up under the enormous selling in the paper derivatives markets on the Comex and LBMA.  This morning’s price attack is a good example:

The chart above shows December paper gold in 5 minute intervals. Typically the price of gold is taken lower leading up to the a.m. London “fix,” in which the “price fix” process is characterized with heavy offerings.  Lately the price bounces after that. And of course there’s the obligatory price-smack when the Comex floor trading commences (8:20 a.m. EST).  Check that box.  Then the “hey can I tell you the good news” item hit the tape about 4 minutes after the NYSE opened.  The hedge fund algos spiked the S&P 500 futures and dumped paper gold.

For the better part of the last 18 years, when this type of “market” action occurs, gold is down for the count. Not only does the initial “fishing line” sell-off hold, but the gold price moves lower throughout the day.  This snap-back action in the gold price after a price attack since early June is unique to the way gold (and silver) has traded over the last 18+ years.

Gold is at or near an all-time high in most fiat paper currencies except the dollar. This summer, however, it would appear that the dollar-based valuation of gold is starting to break the “shackles” of official intervention and is beginning to reflect the underlying fundamentals.  On the assumption that gold can continue to withstand serious efforts to push the price back below $1500 (the net short position in gold futures held by Comex banks is near a record high, for instance), we could see $1600 or higher before Labor Day weekend.

This price-action in gold is being driven by enormous flows of capital into both physical gold and gold “surrogates” or “derivatives.”  Yes, GLD is a derivative of gold – a device used to index the price movement in gold.  The action over the last two months is more remarkable given that the increased excise tax on bullion imports into India has largely stifled import demand beyond what gets smuggled into the country (in excess of 300 tonnes annually).

I have been told my someone who claims to be in a position to know that there’s a buyer of massive amounts of physical gold and silver on every dip in price and that’s what is driving the resiliency of the precious metals.

Make no mistake, even if by chance of a miracle a “trade agreement” is reached between China and the U.S., the underlying economic fundamentals globally have already deteriorated into a recession. And it’s getting worse. It has nothing to do with tariffs.  For the primary cause, research the amount of debt outstanding now vs.  2008…

Moreover, the randomness of unforeseen news events causing sudden market sell-offs and precious metals rallies is starting to occur with greater frequency. This is driving the flight-to-safety move into the precious metals. The mining stocks have lagged relative to the risk-adjusted percentage move since early June in gold and silver. I do not expect that to last for long…

***************

You can learn more about  Investment Research Dynamics newsletters by following these links (note: a minimum subscription period beyond the 1st month is not required):  Short Seller’s Journal subscription information   –   Mining Stock Journal subscription information